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1We are grateful to Michele Lombardi for his comments and suggestions.Abstract. Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in
the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implications of weaker
versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to non-
convex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard
axioms of eﬃciency and strict individual rationality, they imply rationaliz-
ability of solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems. We then characterize
asymmetric Nash solutions by imposing a continuity and the scale invariance
requirements. We also give a characterization of the Nash solution by using
the two rationality conditions. These results make a further connection be-
tween solutions to non-convex bargaining problems and rationalizability of
choice function in the theory of rational choice.
J.E.L. Classiﬁcation Numbers: C71, C78, D63, D71
21 Introduction
In this paper, we study solutions to non-convex bargaining problem by ex-
amining their connections to two well-known rationality conditions, namely
conditions α and β, in the theory of rational choice (see, for example, Sen
(1971)). Condition α says that, when a set A contracts to another set B,a n d
if an option x chosen from A continues to be available in B,t h e nx must be
chosen from B.C o n d i t i o nβ, on the other hand, says that, when two options
x and y are chosen from a set A and when A expands to another set B, then,
either both x and y are chosen from B or neither x nor y are chosen from
B.
In the literature on non-convex bargaining problems, a stronger version of
condition α, often called contraction independence, has been used for char-
acterizing the Nash solution (see, for example, Mariotti (1998, 1999), Xu
and Yoshihara (2006)). Contraction independence requires that, when a
bargaining problem A shrinks to another bargaining problem B and if B
contains some options of the solution to A, then the solution to B coincides
with the intersection of B and the solution to A. This version of contrac-
tion independence can also be regarded as a natural generalization of Nash’s
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Nash (1950)) introduced for
convex bargaining problems where a solution picks a single option from a
bargaining problem.2
Building on the intuitions of conditions α and β,i nt h i sp a p e r ,w ec o n s i d e r
weaker versions of conditions α and β, to be called binary condition α and
binary condition β, respectively. Binary condition α requires that, for any two
options x and y,i fe i t h e rx or y is part of the solution to a bargaining problem
A, then the solution to the bargaining problem given by the comprehensive
hull (see Section 2 for a formal deﬁnition) of x and y must contain the
intersection of {x,y} and the solution to A. Binary condition β requires that,
if two options x and y are the only chosen alternatives from the problem of
the comprehensive hull of x and y, then when the problem is enlarged, either
both belong to the solution to the enlarged problem or neither do not belong
to the solution to the enlarged problem.
We will then use these two weaker rationality conditions to ﬁrst study
2There are other variations of the generalised Nash’s IIA. Mariotti (1998a) introduces
a weaker variant of the standard Nash IIA which is solely applicable to single-valued
solutions, whereas Thomson (1981) introduces a weaker variant of the contraction inde-
pendence discussed in Mariotti (1998, 1999) and Xu and Yoshihara (2006).
3rationalizability of solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems (see Section
3f o raf o r m a ld e ﬁnition). The interest of studying rationalizability of bar-
gaining solutions in the literature is two-fold. In the ﬁrst place, a solution
can be interpreted as a fair arbitration scheme ratiﬁable by a committee (see
Mariotti (1999)), and as a consequence, it represents the majority preferences
of the committee. Secondly, as argued by Peters and Wakker (1991), a solu-
tion to bargaining problems may be thought to reveal the preferences of the
players involved as a group, and thus the behavior of a solution may be linked
to ‘revealed group preference.’ In the literature on bargaining problems, the
rationalizability of solutions to convex bargaining problems has been fruit-
fully studied (see, among others, Peters and Wakker (1991), Bossert (1994),
and Sanchez (2000)), and there is little research on the rationalizability of
solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems (see, however, Kaneko (1980),
Denicolo and Mariotti (2000), for some exceptions). We show that if we
restrict a solution to be eﬃcient and strict individually rational, then the
rationalizability of a solution is equivalent to the combination of our two
weaker rationality conditions. We also point out that neither eﬃciency nor
strict individual rationality is necessary for a solution to be rationalizable
and that there are non-rationalizable solutions satisfying eﬃciency and strict
individual rationality.
Next, we examine the consequences of imposing scale invariance on solu-
tions to nonconvex bargaining problems. We observe that the imposition of
scale invariance on a rationalizable solution to nonconvex bargaining prob-
lems in our context is not suﬃcient to characterize asymmetric Nash solu-
tions. This is in sharp contrast with the results obtained for convex problems
(see, for example, Roth (1977)) and for nonconvex problems where solutions
are restricted to be single-valued (see, for example, Zhou (1997)). To char-
acterize asymmetric Nash solutions in our context, a continuity property on
part of a solution is needed. The continuity axiom we use is fairly weak as it
only restricts to behaviors of solutions to problems given by comprehensive
hulls of two alternatives.
Finally, we use our two rationality conditions to study the Nash solution
to nonconvex bargaining problems. In particular, we show that, together
with the standard axioms of eﬃciency, scale invariance and anonymity, our
two rationality conditions characterize the Nash solution. This result there-
fore improves the existing characterization of the Nash solution to non-convex
bargaining problems (see Mariotti (1998, 1999), Xu and Yoshihara (2006))
and makes a close connection between solutions to non-convex bargaining
4problems and rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. To-
gether with our studies of rationalizable and asymmetric Nash solutions, our
result on the characterization of the Nash solution also sheds new light on
the axioms of anonymity and scale invariance: they together play a role
of continuity and ensure the required representation of the binary relation
rationalizing the underlying solution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following
section, Section 2, we present notation and deﬁnitions. Section 3 studies the
rationalizability of solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems, while Section
4 is devoted to the study of asymmetric Nash solutions. The characterization
o ft h eN a s hs o l u t i o ni sg i v e ni nS e c t i o n5 .W ec o n c l u d ei nS e c t i o n6 .
2 Notation and deﬁnitions
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be the set of all individuals in the society. Let R+ be
the set of all non-negative real numbers, and R++ be the set of all positive
numbers. Let Rn
+ (resp. Rn
++)b et h en-fold Cartesian product of R+ (resp.
R++). For any x,y ∈ Rn
+,w ew r i t ex ≥ y to mean [xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N],
x>yto mean [xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N and x 6= y], and x À y to mean [xi >y i
for all i ∈ N]. For any x ∈ Rn
+ and any non-negative number q,w ew r i t e
z =( q;x−i) ∈ Rn
+ to mean that zi = q and zj = xj for all j ∈ N \{ i}.
For any subset A ⊆ Rn
+, A is said to be (i) non-trivial if there exists
a ∈ A such that a À 0, and (ii) comprehensive if for all x,y ∈ Rn
+, [x ≥ y
and x ∈ A] implies y ∈ A. For all A ⊆ Rn
+,d e ﬁne the comprehensive hull of





+ | z ≤ x for some x ∈ A
ª
.
Let Σ be the set of all non-trivial, compact and comprehensive subsets
of Rn
+.E l e m e n t si nΣ are interpreted as (normalized) bargaining problems.
A bargaining solution F assigns a nonempty subset F(A) of A for every
bargaining problem A ∈ Σ.
Let π be a permutation of N. The set of all permutations of N is denoted
by Π. For all x =( xi)i∈N ∈ Rn
+,l e tπ(x)=( xπ(i))i∈N. For all A ∈ Σ and
any permutation π ∈ Π,l e tπ(A)={π(a) | a ∈ A}. For any A ∈ Σ,w es a y
that A is symmetric if A = π(A) for all π ∈ Π.
Deﬁnition 1: A bargaining solution F over Σ is the Nash solution if for all




i∈N xi for all x ∈ A}.
5D e n o t et h eN a s hs o l u t i o nb yFN. Note that, for nonconvex bargaining prob-
lems, the Nash solution is typically multi-valued.3
3 Rationalizable solutions
In this section, we study the problem of rationalizability of solutions to non-
convex problems. First, we deﬁne the notion of rationalizable solutions in
our context.
Deﬁnition 2: A bargaining solution F over Σ is rationalizable if there exists
ar e ﬂexive, complete and transitive binary relation R over Rn
+ such that, for
all A ∈ Σ, F(A)={x ∈ A | xRy for all y ∈ A}.
Under what condition is a solution F over Σ rationalizable? To answer
this question, we begin by introducing some axioms to be imposed on a
solution to nonconvex bargaining problems. The ﬁrst two, Eﬃciency and
Strict Individual Rationality, are well-known in the literature.
Eﬃciency (E): For any A ∈ Σ and any a ∈ F(A),t h e r ei sn ox ∈ A such
that x>a .
Strict Individual Rationality (SIR): For all A ∈ Σ, x ∈ F(A) ⇒ x À 0.
In the literature on Nash bargaining problems and on rational choice
theory, various contraction independence properties have been proposed. The
idea behind a contraction independence property is the following: given two
bargaining problems, A and B,i nw h i c hA is a subset of B, and suppose
that a point x chosen from B as a solution to B continues to be available in
A,t h e nx should continue to be a solution to A provided certain restrictions
are satisﬁed. The following axiom, to be called (BCα), is a weaker version of
the contraction independence used in nonconvex bargaining problems (see,
for example, Thomson (1981), Mariotti (1998, 1999), and Xu and Yoshihara
(2006)). It requires that, for any two points x and y in a bargaining problem
A,i fe i t h e rx or y is part of the solution to A, then the common points in
3The Nash solution to non-convex problems discussed in this paper was ﬁrstly pro-
posed by Kaneko (1980). There are other extensions of the Nash solution into non-convex
problems such as Herrero (1989) and Conley and Wilkie (1996).
6{x,y} and the solution to A must be contained in the solution to the problem
given by the comprehensive hull of x and y. It may be noted that the origin of
(BCα) goes back to Herzberger (1973) (see also Sen (1977)) where a similar
condition is introduced for ﬁnite choice problems: if an option x is chosen
from a set A then x must be chosen from any two-element set {x,y} as long
as y is contained in A as well. Clearly, (BCα)i sa l s ow e a k e rt h a nc o n d i t i o n
α in the literature on rational choice theory (also known as the Chernoﬀ
condition, see Chernoﬀ (1954) and Sen (1971)). Formally, (BCα) is stated
as follows.
Binary Condition α (BCα): For all A ∈ Σ and all x,y ∈ A,i f{x,y} ∩
F(A) 6= ∅ then F(A) ∩ {x,y} ⊆ F(comp{x,y}).
It may be noted that (BCα)i ss p e c i ﬁc to non-convex bargaining problems
and is not applicable to convex bargaining problems. We next introduce a
weaker version of condition β (see Sen (1971)).
Binary Condition β (BCβ): For all A ∈ Σ and all x,y ∈ A,i f{x,y} =
F(comp{x,y}),t h e n[ x ∈ F(A) ⇔ y ∈ F(A)].
Thus, (BCβ) requires that, whenever the solution to the problem comp{x,y}
is consisted of both x and y, then, for any problem A containing both x and y,
either [x and y are both chosen as solutions to A] or neither x nor y is chosen
as a solution to A.I n a w a y ,( B C β) stipulates that whenever two alterna-
tives, x and y, are “informationally equivalent” in a pairwise comparison,
then they must be treated “equally”.
With the help of the above axioms, we now state and prove our ﬁrst main
result.
Theorem 1. Let a solution F over Σ satisfy (E) and (SIR). Then, F satisﬁes
(BCα)a n d( B C β) if and only if F is rationalizable.
Proof. We note that if a solution F over Σ is rationalizable, then F satisﬁes
both (BCα)a n d( B C β). Therefore, we need only to show that if a solution F
over Σ satisﬁes (E), (SIR), (BCα)a n d( B C β), then it must be rationalizable.
Let a solution F over Σ satisfy (E), (SIR), (BCα)a n d( B C β). Deﬁne a
binary relation R over Rn
+ as follows: for all x,y ∈ Rn
+,
if x = y,t h e nxRx;
7if x 6= y,t h e nxRy ⇔ [x ∈ F(comp{x,y})]o r[y/ ∈ F(A) for all
A ∈ Σ with x,y ∈ A].
We ﬁr s tn o t et h a t ,f o ra n yx,y ∈ Rn
+,i fyi =0for some i ∈ N,t h e nb y
(SIR), y/ ∈ F(A) for all A ∈ Σ with x,y ∈ A. Therefore, for any x,y ∈ Rn
+,
[yi =0for some i ∈ N] ⇒ xRy.F u r t h e r , i f x À 0 and yi =0for some
i ∈ N, then, by (E) and (SIR), {x} = F(comp{x,y}) implying that xRy and
not(yRx). Therefore, the binary relation R is well-deﬁned.
Note that R thus deﬁned is reﬂexive and complete. We now show that
R is transitive. To see that R is transitive, consider x,y,z ∈ Rn
+ such
that xRy and yRz.I f xi =0for some i ∈ N,t h e nxRy implies that
yj =0for some j ∈ N,a n dyRz together with [yj =0for some j ∈ N]
implies zk =0for some k ∈ N. Therefore, xRz follows from the deﬁ-
nition of R.I f yi =0for some i ∈ N,t h e nyRz implies that zj =0
for some j ∈ N. In this case, xRz follows from the deﬁnition of R.I f
zi =0for some i ∈ N,t h e nxRz follows again from the deﬁnition of R.
Consider therefore that x À 0,y À 0 and z À 0. Given that xRy and
yRz,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tx ∈ F(comp{x,y}) and y ∈ F(comp{y,z}).
We need to show that x ∈ F(comp{x,z}). Suppose to the contrary that
x/ ∈ F(comp{x,z}).B y ( E ) , {z} = F(comp{x,z}). Consider the problem
comp{x,y,z}.N o t e t h a t comp{x,y,z} ∈ Σ.C o n s i d e r F(comp{x,y,z}).
By (E), F(comp{x,y,z}) ⊆ {x,y,z}.I f x ∈ F(comp{x,y,z}),n o t i n gt h a t
{x,z}∩F(comp{x,y,z}) 6= ∅, it follows from (BCα)t h a tF(comp{x,y,z})∩
{x,z} ⊆ F(comp{x,z}),t h a ti s ,x ∈ F(comp{x,z}), a contradiction. There-
fore, x/ ∈ F(comp{x,y,z}).I f y ∈ F(comp{x,y,z}),n o t i n gt h a tx ∈
F(comp{x,y}) by xRy and (BCα), we must have F(comp{x,y})={x,y}
by (BCα). It then follows from (BCβ)t h a tx ∈ F(comp{x,y,z}),w h i c h ,
from the above, leads to a contradiction. Therefore, y/ ∈ F(comp{x,y,z}).
If z ∈ F(comp{x,y,z}),n o t i n gt h a ty ∈ F(comp{y,z}) by yRz and (BCα),
it follows from (BCα)t h a tF(comp{y,z})={y,z}. It then follows from
(BCβ)t h a ty ∈ F(comp{x,y,z}), which, from the above, leads to a contra-
diction. Therefore, z/ ∈ F(comp{x,y,z}). Consequently, F(comp{x,y,z}) ∩
{x,y,z} = ∅, a contradiction. Thus, it must be true that x ∈ F(comp{x,z})
implying xRz. Therefore, R is transitive.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, we need to show that, for all A ∈ Σ,
F(A)={x ∈ A | xRy for all y ∈ A}.C o n s i d e r A ∈ Σ.L e t x ∈ F(A).
By (SIR), for any y ∈ A with yi =0for some i ∈ N,w em u s th a v exRy.
For any y ∈ A with y À 0,s i n c ex ∈ F(A),b y( B C α), it follows that
8x ∈ F(comp{x,y}) implying that xRy.T h e r e f o r e , F(A) ⊆ {x ∈ A | xRy
for all y ∈ A}. We next show that {x ∈ A | xRy for all y ∈ A} ⊆ F(A).
Suppose, to the contrary, that it is not true that {x ∈ A | xRy for all
y ∈ A} ⊆ F(A). Then, there must exist x ∈ A such that xRy for all y ∈ A,
but x/ ∈ F(A).N o t et h a ti tm u s tb et r u et h a tx À 0.C o n s i d e rz ∈ F(A).
(SIR) implies that z À 0.B y ( B C α)a n df r o mz ∈ F(A) and x ∈ A,w e
must have z ∈ F(comp{x,z}).N o t et h a txRz,t h a ti s ,x ∈ F(comp{x,z}).
Therefore, {x,z} = F(comp{x,z}).B y( B C β) and noting that z ∈ F(A),i t
then follows that x ∈ F(A), a contradiction. Therefore, {x ∈ A | xRy for all
y ∈ A} ⊆ F(A). Hence, F(A)={x ∈ A | xRy for all y ∈ A} ⊆ F(A). ¦
Remark 1. It may be noted that (BCα)a n d( B C β)a r en o ts u ﬃcient for a
solution F to be rationalizable. In particular, there exists non-rationalizable
solution F over Σ that satisﬁes (BCα)a n d( B C β) but violates (E) and (SIR).
For example, for any A ∈ Σ,l e tFWP(A)={x ∈ A | there exists no y ∈ A
such that y À x} (that is, the solution is given by all weakly Pareto eﬃcient
utility vectors in A). Clearly, this solution satisﬁes both (BCα)a n d( B C β),
but violates (E) and (SIR). The solution is not rationalizable by any binary
relation R over Rn
+:c o n s i d e rn =2 , x =( 1 ,2), y =( 2 ,1), A = comp{(3,2)}
and B = comp{(2,3)}. Then, x ∈ F(A),y / ∈ F(A),y∈ F(B) and x/ ∈ F(B)
implying no binary relation R can be deﬁned over R2
+ that would rationalize
the solution.
Remark 2. It may be noted that (E) is not necessary for a solution to be ra-
tionalizable: there exists a rationalizable solution that satisﬁes (SIR), (BCα)
and (BCβ) but violates (E). To see this, consider the following solution: for
all A ∈ Σ,l e tFE(A)={x ∈ A | x1 = ···= xn, and there exists no y ∈ A
such that y À x} (the Egalitarian solution).
Remark 3. It is also interesting to note that (SIR) is not necessary for
a solution to be rationalizable: there exists a rationalizable solution that
satisﬁes (E), (BCα)a n d( B C β) but violates (SIR). To see this, let ≥lex be a
standard lexicographic binary relation deﬁned over Rn
+.D e ﬁne the solution,
Flex as follows: for all A ∈ Σ, Flex(A)={x ∈ A : x ≥lex y for all y ∈ A}.
Remark 4. It may be noted that (E) is indispensable in Theorem 1:
there are non-rationalizable solutions that satisfy (SIR), (BCα)a n d( B C β),
but violates (E). To show this, let #N =2and for each A ∈ Σ,l e t
E (A) ≡ {x ∈ A | x1 = x2 > 0}. Then, deﬁne F1 as follows: for any A ∈ Σ,
9F1 (A)=FN (A) ∪ E (A).N o t e t h a t F1 satisﬁes (SIR) but violates (E).
Note that, for all {x,y} ∈ Σ, {x,y} = F1(comp{x,y}) does not hold since
F1(comp{x,y}) contains E (comp{x,y}).T h u s , ( B C β) is vacuously satis-
ﬁed by F1. F1 also satisﬁes (BCα). To see this, consider A ∈ Σ, x,y ∈ A
such that {x,y} ∩ F 1(A) 6= ∅.L e t x,y ∈ F1 (A).I f x,y ∈ E (A),t h e n
x,y ∈ F1 (comp{x,y}).I f x ∈ FN (A)\E (A) and y ∈ E (A),t h e nx,y ∈
F1 (comp{x,y}).I fx,y ∈ FN (A)\E (A),t h e nx,y ∈ F1 (comp{x,y}).L e t
x ∈ F1 (A) and y/ ∈ F1 (A).I f x ∈ E (A),t h e nx ∈ F1 (comp{x,y}).
If x ∈ FN (A)\E (A),t h e nx ∈ F1 (comp{x,y}).T h e r e f o r e , F1 satisﬁes
(BCα). Finally, F1 is not rationalizable. Consider A = comp{(4,2)} and
B = comp{(4,1),(2,2)}. Then, (4,2),(2,2) ∈ F1 (A) and (4,1) / ∈ F1 (A),
while (4,1),(2,2) ∈ F1 (B). Suppose F1 is rationalizable by a binary rela-
tion R. Then, by considering the problem A,w em u s th a v e(2,2)R(4,1) and
not(4,1)R(2,2), and by considering the problem B,w eh a v e(2,2)R(4,1) and
(4,1)R(2,2), which is a contradiction. Therefore, F1 is not rationalizable.
Remark 5. We note that (SIR) is indispensable in Theorem 1: there are non-
rationalizable solutions satisfying (E), (BCα), (BCβ) and violating (SIR). To
see this, let mi(A)=m a x {ai | (a1,···,a i,···,a n) ∈ A} for all A ∈ Σ and
all i ∈ N.T h e r e f o r e ,m(A) ≡ (mi(A))i∈N is the ideal point of A. For each
i ∈ N,l e tmi(A) ≡ (mi(A);0−i).L e t P (A) be the set of Pareto eﬃcient
alternatives in A ∈ Σ.A g a i n , l e t #N =2 .G i v e n A ∈ Σ,l e te A ⊆ A be
deﬁned as follows:
e A = {x ∈ A | ∀²>0,∃y ∈ R
2
++ with ||y − x|| <² ,y∈ A}
(For example, when A = comp{(1,1),(2,0)},t h e n e A = comp{(1,1)}.) Let
FU (A) ≡ {x ∈ A | ∀y ∈ A : x1 + x2 ≥ y1 + y2} for any A ∈ Σ. Then, deﬁne
F2 as follows: for any A ∈ Σ,
1) if min{m1(A),m 2(A)} >x 1+x2 for any x ∈ e A,t h e nF2 (A)={m1(A),m 2(A)};
2) if min{m1(A),m 2(A)} ≤ x1+x2 for some x ∈ e A, but FU (A)∩{m1(A),m 2(A)} 6=
∅,t h e nF2 (A)=FU (A) ∩ {m1(A),m 2(A)};a n d
3) if FU (A) ∩ {m1(A),m 2(A)} = ∅,t h e nF2 (A)=FU (A).
This solution satisﬁes (E), but violates (SIR). It also satiﬁes (BCα)a n d
(BCβ). Consider (BCα) ﬁrst. Take any A ∈ Σ and any x,y ∈ A, and sup-
pose F2 (A)∩{x,y} 6= ∅. If case 3) above is applicable, then (BCα)i so b v i -
ously satisﬁed. If case 2) above is applicable, then F2 (A) ⊆ {m1(A),m 2(A)}.
Without loss of generality, let x ∈ {m1(A),m 2(A)}.I fy ∈ {m1(A),m 2(A)},
10then comp{x,y} / ∈ Σ, which implies that (BCα)i st r i v i a l l ys a t i s ﬁed. If
y/ ∈ {m1(A),m 2(A)} and y ∈ R2
+\R2
++,a g a i ncomp{x,y} / ∈ Σ.I f y/ ∈
{m1(A),m 2(A)} and y ∈ Rn
++,t h e ncomp{x,y} ∈ Σ and it corresponds to
case 2), so that x ∈ F2 (comp{x,y}). If case 1) above is applicable, then
F2 (A)={m1(A),m 2(A)}.L e tx ∈ {m1(A),m 2(A)} and y/ ∈ {m1(A),m 2(A)}.
Then, if y ∈ e A ∩ R2
++, comp{x,y} ∈ Σ and we are back to case 2). Thus,
x ∈ F2 (comp{x,y}). Therefore, F2 satisﬁes (BCα).
We now consider (BCβ). Note that for any A ∈ Σ,e i t h e rF2 (A) ⊆ {m1(A),m 2(A)}
or F2 (A) ⊆ R2
++.T a k e a n y A ∈ Σ and any x,y ∈ A, and suppose
F2 (comp{x,y})={x,y}. First of all, comp{m1(A),m 2(A)} / ∈ Σ.M o r e -
over, if x ∈ {m1(A),m 2(A)} and y ∈ R2
++,t h e nF2 (comp{x,y})={x,y}
does not hold. Thus, that F2 (comp{x,y})={x,y} implies case 3) is ap-
plicable. Consequently, FU (comp{x,y})={x,y}. Therefore, F2 satisﬁes
(BCβ).
To see that F2 is not rationalizable, let M be the unit simplex, and consider
x =( 0 ,2), y =( 2 ,0), A = comp({x,(3,0)}∪ M),a n dB = comp({y,(0,3)}∪ M).
Note that x ∈ F2(A),y / ∈ F2(A),y∈ F2(B) and x/ ∈ F2(B) implying no bi-
nary relation R can be deﬁned over R2
+ that will rationalize F2.
Remark 6. (BCα) is indispensable in Theorem 1: there are non-rationalizable
solutions satisfying (E), (SIR) and (BCβ) but violating (BCα). To see this,
consider the lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky solution FlexKS which is de-
ﬁn e da su s u a l . T h i ss o l u t i o ns a t i s ﬁes all the axioms in Theorem 1 except
(BCα) and is not rationalizable.
Remark 7. (BCβ) is indispensable in Theorem 1: there are non-rationalizable
solutions satisfying (E), (SIR) and (BCα)b u tv i o l a t i n g( B C β). To see this,
for any A ∈ Σ,l e tFPSIR(A)={x ∈ A ∩ Rn
++ | there exists no y ∈ A
such that y>x }. This solution satisﬁes all the axioms in Theorem 1 except
(BCβ) and is not rationalizable.
Remark 8. It is interesting to note that several works (for example, Roth
(1977) and Zhou (1997)) have used (SIR)w i t h o u t( E )t od e r i v et h e( a s y m m e t -
ric) Nash solution. In our domain, however, there is even a non-rationalizable
solution that satisﬁes (SIR), (BCα)a n d( B C β)a ss h o w ne a r l i e ri nR e m a r k
4.
114 Asymmetric Nash solutions
In this section, we show that under (E), (SIR), (BCα)a n d( B C β), if we
impose Nash’s scale invariance axiom and require a solution to be continu-
ous (see the formal deﬁn i t i o nb e l o w ) ,t h e nw eo b t a i na na s y m m e t r i cN a s h
solution deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 3. A bargaining solution F over Σ is an asymmetric Nash solu-
tion if there exist t1 ≥ 0,···,t n ≥ 0 and t1 + ···+ tn > 0 such that, for all








i for all y ∈ A}
To study asymmetric Nash solutions, we ﬁrst introduce the axioms of
s c a l ei n v a r i a n c ea n dc o n t i n u i t y .
Scale Invariance (SI): For all A ∈ Σ and all t ∈ Rn
++,i ftA = {(tiai)i∈N |
a ∈ A} then F(tA)={(tiai)i∈N | a ∈ F(A)}.
Continuity (CON): For any x,y ∈ Rn
+ with x 6= y,i f{x} = F(comp{x,y})
then there exists ²>0 such that for all z À 0 and all z0 ∈ Rn
+,
[||z − x|| <²⇒ {z} = F(comp{y,z})] and [||z
0 − y|| <²⇒ {x} = F(comp{x,z
0})].
It may be noted that (CON) introduced above is very diﬀerent from var-
ious continuity properties discussed in the literature on bargaining problems
(see, for example, ). To a certain degree, (CON) is a weaker requirement
as it restricts its applicability to a class of problems each consisting of the
comprehensive hull of two points.
W i t ht h eh e l po f( C O N ) ,w ep r e s e n ta n dp r o v et h es e c o n dm a i nr e s u l to f
our paper.
Theorem 2. As o l u t i o nF over Σ satisﬁes (E), (SIR), (BCα), (BCβ), (SI)
a n d( C O N )i fa n do n l yi fi ti sa na s y m m e t r i cN a s h .
Proof. It can be checked that an asymmetric Nash solution satisﬁes (E),
(SIR), (BCα), (BCβ), (SI) and (CON). We now show that if a solution
satisﬁes (E), (SIR), (BCα), (BCβ) ,( S I )a n d( C O N ) ,t h e ni tm u s tb ea n
asymmetric Nash solution.
12Let F satisfy (E), (SIR), (BCα), (BCβ), (SI) and (CON). From Theorem
1, F is rationalizable by a reﬂexive, transitive and complete binary relation
R over Rn
+.D e ﬁne the binary relation R as in the proof of Theorem 1. Note
that F satisﬁes (CON). Then, R must be continuous over Rn
++.S i n c e F
satisﬁes (SI), R satisﬁes the following property: for all x,y ∈ Rn
++ and all
λ ∈ Rn
++, xRy ⇔ (λ1x1,···,λnxn)R(λ1y1,···,λnyn). Then, following Tsui
and Weymark (1997) (see also Xu (2002)), there exist t1,···,t n such that,









i . By (E), it follows that
t1 ≥ 0,···,t n ≥ 0 and t1 + ···+ tn > 0.N o t et h a ti fyi =0for some i ∈ N,
then xRy. Therefore, R can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas function.
Hence, F is an asymmetric Nash solution. ¦
Remark 9. Note that (CON) is indispensable in Theorem 2. Indeed, there
exists a solution satisfying (E), (SIR), (BCα), (BCβ) and (SI) while vio-
lating (CON). For instance, consider the following solution: for all A ∈ Σ,
F3(A)={x ∈ FN (A) | x ≥lex y for all y ∈ FN (A)},w h e r e≥lex is a usual
lexicographic relation. This solution satisﬁes (E), (SIR), (BCα), (BCβ), and
(SI), but violates (CON). By the deﬁnition, F3 is neither an asymmetric
Nash nor the (symmetric) Nash solution.
Remark 10. Roth (1977) uses (SIR) to derive an asymmetric Nash solution
for convex bargaining problems. Zhou (1997) uses (SIR) together with Nash’s
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (which is stronger than our (BCα)
and (SI) to derive an asymmetric Nash solution for nonconvex bargaining
problems. In Zhou’s approach, a solution is assumed to be single-valued. In
our context with a multi-valued solution, if we drop (E), the solution FWP−
which is deﬁned as, for any A ∈ Σ, FWP−(A)={x ∈ A∩Rn
++ | there exists
no y ∈ A such that y À x},s a t i s ﬁes (SIR), (BCα), (BCβ), and (SI). Thus,
there are solutions other than asymmetric Nash solutions satisfying (SIR),
(BCα), (BCβ), and (SI). Note that FWP− satisﬁes (CON).
Remark 11. It is interesting to note that, there are single-valued solu-
tions satisfying (E), (BCα), (BCβ)a n d( S I ) ,w h i c ha r ed i ﬀerent from asym-
metric Nash solutions. Let ≥lex be a standard lexicographic binary rela-
tion deﬁned over Rn
+.D e ﬁne the solution, Flex, as follows: for all A ∈ Σ,
Flex(A)={x ∈ A | x ≥lex y for all y ∈ A}. This solution satisﬁes (E),
(BCα) (because the solution is rationalizable), (BCβ) (because the solution
is again rationalizable) and (SI). Flex is single-valued. Note that Flex vio-
lates (SIR) and (CON). This suggests that (E), (BCα), (BCβ), (SI) and the
13single-valuedness of a solution are not suﬃcient to derive asymmetric Nash
solutions.
5N a s h s o l u t i o n
We now turn to the Nash solution. We ﬁr s tn o t et h a tt h eN a s hs o l u t i o n
satisﬁes the following property:
Anonymity (A): For any A ∈ Σ,i fA is symmetric, then [a ∈ F(A) ⇒
π(a) ∈ F(A) for all π ∈ Π].
Theorem 3. As o l u t i o nF over Σ satisﬁes (E), (BCα), (BCβ), (SI) and (A)
if and only if F = FN.
Proof. I tc a nb ec h e c k e dt h a tt h eN a s hs o l u t i o ns a t i s ﬁes (E), (BCα), (BCβ),
(SI) and (A). We need only to show that, if a solution satisﬁes (E), (BCα),
(BCβ), (SI) and (A), then it must be the Nash solution.
Let F be a solution over Σ satisfying (E), (BCα), (BCβ), (SI) and (A).
From Theorem 1, F is rationalizable by the binary relation R over Rn
+ de-
ﬁned below: xRy ⇔ x ∈ F(comp{x,y}).W e n e x t s h o w t h a t R is actually
representable by the Cobb-Douglas function over Rn
+ with equal weights.
Given that R is complete and transitive, we need only to show that, for





i∈N yi > 0 ⇒ F(comp(x,y)) = {x,y},a n d Q
i∈N xi >
Q





i∈N yi > 0. Consider an appropraite t ∈ Rn
++ such that
tx =( t1x1,···,t ixi,···tnxn) and ty =( t1y1,···,t iyi,···,t nyn) are permuta-
tions of each other (this is always possible due to the fact that x and y have
t h es a m eN a s hp r o d u c t ) .L e tS ≡ comp{tx,ty}. Then, let T ≡∪ π∈Ππ(S).
By construction, T is symmetric, and {π(tx),π(ty) | π ∈ Π} ⊆ T is the set
of all eﬃcient outcomes in T.T h u s , F (T) ⊆ {π(tx),π(ty) | π ∈ Π},a n d
let tx ∈ F (T). Then, by (A), {π (tx) | π ∈ Π} ⊆ F (T).A l s o ,s i n c etx and
ty are permutations of each other, ty ∈ F (T) by (A). Then, again by (A),
{π(ty) | π ∈ Π} ⊆ F (T).T h u s , F (T)={π(tx),π(ty) | π ∈ Π}.T h u s ,






i∈N yi ≥ 0. Then, by choosing an appropriate
ε ∈ Rn




i∈N zi for z ≡
y + ε. Then, from the last paragraph, F(comp{x,z})={x,z}.N o t et h a t ,
14by the construction, y ∈ comp{x,z},a n dF(comp{x,z}) ∩ {x,y} = {x}.
Therefore, x ∈ F(comp{x,y}) follows from (BCα). If y ∈ F(comp{x,y}),
then (BCβ) would imply that y ∈ F(comp{x,z}), a contradiction. Therefore,
y/ ∈ F(comp{x,y}).





i∈N yi. Hence, F is the
Nash solution. ¦
Theorem 3 thus gives an alternative characterization of the Nash solution
to non-convex bargaining problems. From the characterization result of the
Nash solution to nonconvex bargainingp r o b l e m si nX ua n dY o s h i h a r a( 2 0 0 6 ) ,
it is clear that, in the presence of (E), (A) and (SI), Contraction Independence
is equivalent to (BCα) and (BCβ). As a matter of fact, it can be easily
checked that, under (E), (BCβ) is implied by Contraction Independence,
which states that, for all A,B ∈ Σ with B ⊆ A and all x ∈ A ∩ B,i f
x ∈ F(A) then x ∈ F(B). Therefore, the result of Theorem 3 strengthens
the characterization result given in Xu and Yoshihara (2006).
Note that in Theorem 3, (CON) is not needed, though is implied by
the axioms ﬁgured in the theorem. The reason why (CON) is not needed
here is that, from Theorem 1 and in the presence of (E), (BCα)a n d( B C β),
the solution is rationalizable; then, (A) and (SI) ensure the construction
of “indiﬀerence surfaces" and such indiﬀerence surfaces are based on Cobb-
Douglas function with equal weights.
Given the remarks following Theorem 1 and from Theorem 2, the inde-
pendence of the axioms ﬁgured in Theorem 3 can be readily checked.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have examined the implications of two weaker versions
of conditions α and β in the context of solutions to non-convex bargain-
ing problems. In particular, we have shown that, (i) under eﬃciency and
strict individual rationality, they are equivalent to rationalizable solutions,
(ii) together with eﬃciency, strict individual rationality, scale invariance and
a weak continuity requirement, they characterize asymmetric Nash solutions,
and (iii) together with eﬃciency, anonymity and scale invariance, they char-
acterize the Nash solution. Conditions α and β, together, characterize ratio-
nalizability of a choice function deﬁned over the set of all non-empty subsets
of a ﬁnite universal set in terms of an ordering. It is therefore interesting
15to note that, in non-convex bargainging problems, (BCα)a n d( B C β)a r ea s -
sociated with “rationalizability” of a solution to bargaining problems. Our
results clarify several issues relating to rationalizable solutions to nonconvex
bargaining problems and to asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions, make fur-
ther connections between two widely used rationality conditions in rational
choice theory and solutions to non-convex bargaining problems, and improve
characterizations of asymmetric Nash and the Nash solutions to nonconvex
bargaining problems.
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